Economist and banker Cheickna Bounajim Cisse has just published “FCFA – Hidden Face of African Finance” (Ed BoD, 2019). The author reviews the controversy related to the presence of France in the decision-making bodies of the African central banks of the franc zone.
Money is a tool of hunting, an instrument of domination, in the hands of those who guarantee it, manufacture it, emit it, create it and circulate it. In a word, of those who control it. The CFA Francs, these 70-year-old currencies shared by 14 African countries in the franc zone, are increasingly attracting the attention of the press and social networks.
In this media and numismatic meditation, there is too much speculation and approximation. Very often, those who speak of it know little about it; and those who know say as little as possible. Between the cfiles [1] nailed to the scientific and academic prism, and the cfobes [2] studded by dogmatic and utopian ideology, there is the life of 164 million Africans, abused and disillusioned, who continue to be hunted and hunted by illiteracy, terrorism, slavery, extremism, radicalism, fanaticism, racism, incivism, pessimism …
At the heart of the picrocholine war between anti and pro-CFA is the presence of France in the statutory bodies of issuing institutes of African countries of the franc zone (PAZF). Does the former colonial power really have a “right of veto” in the central banks of its former African colonies? In this cavalcade, where everyone speaks for his parish, let us recite this morality of Montesquieu: “Natural equity requires that the degree of proof be proportionate to the size of the accusation”. Therefore, it is not a question here of arbitrating elegance. We are neither a breaker of the CFA franc nor a cacique of the CFA franc; we are only a poor storyteller who counts the misfortunes of this ancient colonial currency. Better, we consider that the stakes for the African populations of the franc zone, gutted and condemned (almost) to a life of hermit and ascetic, go far beyond this binary reasoning. In doing so, we free ourselves from two flaws: denial and delirium. No partisan position should disguise reality. Neither on the side of the cfobes who would try to overestimate the presence of France in the community decision-making bodies. Neither on the side of cfiles who would risk to minimize this role. The truth is certainly in the middle of these sophisms.
The position of the “cfobes”: France has a right of veto
The controversy over the CFA franc does not date from today. It is as old as the septuagenarian currency. Many African leaders and executives have stepped up to criticize, and even denounce, the presence of France in the statutory organs of the PAZF central banks. Recently, they found to the two Italian vice-premiers unexpected allies. However, they must stand out from the populist and demagogic statements of these Italian leaders, if they want to make good fortune wise advice Amadou Hampâté Bâ: “If the court of the sheep is dirty, it is not pork to say. ”
According to a summary of his book The CFA Franc and the Euro against Africa (AS Global Solidarity, 2000), Professor Nicolas Agbohou underlines that “France has a right of veto within each of central banks, without any African country having a reciprocal view of French monetary policy. By this veto, many benefits promised to Africans regarding the CFA franc can not be realized, because France will always and logically veto to avoid for example quantitative easing operations, or that the accounts of operations are lastingly negative, which would go against the interests of France. The consequence of this right of veto is that African countries can not even use this currency (business loans, quantitative easing, devaluation, overvaluation, etc.) to boost their economies [3]. ”
More than a decade later, the Ivorian economist persists and signs: “France has a right of veto in the Board of Directors of the three African central banks that it undeniably controls. He explained: “Because in the Comoros, the Board of Directors” deliberates validly when at least six of its members are present or represented. The deliberations must be adopted by at least five members present or represented. “The BEAC Board of Directors” deliberates validly when at least one director per Member State and a French director are present or represented. “When the order of the the day of the meeting of the Board of Directors does not interest him, it is enough simply France to apply the policy of the empty chair to block the correct functioning of these central banks and that of the States which are members. The same right of French veto is exercised by the BCEAO, which maintains by statute that the modifications of its own statutes inherited from colonization “must obtain the unanimity of the members of the Board of Directors.” This means that France perpetuates colonialism by this legal provision which is for it a powerful weapon for maintaining the status quo ante. [4] ”
Cameroonian essayist Éric Essono is also decided on the subject: “All important decisions of the Board of Directors are taken unanimously, which amounts to giving France a right to life and death on any decision its shareholder interests. [5] ”
The position of the “cfiles”: France has no right of veto
The governor of the BCEAO Tiémoko Meyliet Koné is categorical: France does not have the right of veto in the instances of its institution. He reaffirmed, at the microphone of Alain Foka, stating that the representative of the French State on the Board of Directors of the BCEAO is “a director like all others. He has no decision-making power. He does not even have, as I have heard, a veto. Because a veto right is legal. It’s written in the text. And we conceive it from the beginning and we apply it. He has no special right over another director. […] If we must make decisions by voting, it will be a simple majority and this is what is provided for in the texts. [6] ”
What is France doing in African central banks?
The position of the two parties thus exposed, we will allow us an incursion into the monetary lair of PAZF. Let us specify, immediately, that France is not a shareholder of the BCEAO, to take only this case. The texts of this institution indicate that its capital is fully subscribed in equal shares by the WAMU Member States (Article 3 of the statutes). Until proven otherwise, France is not a member of WAMU. On the other hand, without holding any share of BCEAO’s capital, it is only a member of its deliberative body.
This is certainly the first corner of the controversy. To understand this particular position of France, it is necessary to resort to the founding texts of the subregional institution. Its statutes mention that “the State guaranteeing the convertibility of the common currency”, in this case France [7], is a member of the Monetary Policy Committee [8] (Article 67) of the Administrative Council. [9] of the BCEAO (Article 80) and the WAMU Banking Commission. In sum, France is a non-shareholder director. As such, can she claim the status of independent director, as should be the case in such circumstances? Certainly, no. It is necessary at this level to be clear. France is the guarantor and manufacturer (supplier) of the CFA franc. She is not neutral. By sitting on the deliberative body of the PAZF’s central banks, she defends her interests first and foremost, before striving to provide any advice that other directors could not do without [10].
However, can we say that France has a “right of veto”? Certainly not. This is at least the opinion of Governor Tiemoko Meyliet Koné. And on this point, the boss of the BCEAO is not wrong. But only partly. Indeed, no reference to the “right of veto” is made explicitly in the statutes of the Community institution, which specify that “every member
[administrator]
has the right to vote and has one vote for this purpose “(Article 81 of the bylaws), and that” decisions [of the board of directors] are taken by a simple majority of the votes cast by the members. In case of a tie vote, the President [BCEAO Governor] has the casting vote. ”
On the other hand, for certain important decisions of the WAMU organs, the unanimous opinion of all the members (including that of the representative of the French State) is required. For example, amendments to the statutes of the BCEAO can only be authorized by unanimity [11] of the members of the Board of Directors or the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC).
This is the second node of the controversy between pro and anti-CFA. The representative of the French Republic does not sit on the Board of Directors of the BCEAO, or on the WAMU Banking Commission, or even on the Monetary Policy Committee to inaugurate the chrysanthemums. Malian lyricists say: “When you see the tongue circulating between your fingers, if it does not look for salt, it looks for oil. France participates well in decision-making within WAMU organs. Without overestimating it, her voice counts, at least as much as any other statutory member. Moreover, if the presence of France in the organs of the WAMU is as insignificant, as seem to want to accredit the cfiles, why the ex-colonial power continues to chaperone African central banks, forty years after their Africanization and nearly six decades after the political independence of their member states? Is it for the relevance of the “point of view” of the representatives of France? Is it the guarantee of a “total transparency”, so necessary to the African regulator to dispel any “vagueness” on its activities? In an interview with Jeune Afrique, published online on November 15, 2016, the BCEAO governor provides an initial response: “It is clear that France will seek to ensure that the mechanisms put in place in this framework [convertibility CFA francs in exchange for a portion of the foreign exchange reserves of the central banks of the franc zone deposited in an account with the French Treasury] are respected. [12] ”
At the BEAC [13], the Board of Directors comprises 14 members, with 2 directors for each Member State and 2 for France. Here too, one can not speak of “majority” or deduce a “right of veto”.
In the Comoros, the situation is somewhat different from the other two currency areas. According to the official website of the Central Bank of the Comoros (BCC), its board of directors is composed of eight members, four of whom (50%) represent the interests of France [14].
Let’s widen the horizon of interrogations. In application of the principle of parallelism of forms, is there a representative of the African States of the Franc Zone or their institutions (BCEAO, BEAC, BCC) which sits on the General Council of the Banque de France and the College? Supervisory Authority of the Prudential Supervisory Authority and Resolution (ACPR)? At the present stage of our research [15], we can only answer this question in the negative and deplore this “asymmetry”.
France, which is statistically absent from the UEMOA and CEMAC ministers’ councils, has also devised a new technical structure to better control the economies of African countries in the franc zone (PAZF). Thus, the Franc Zone Convergence Committee (COCOZOF) was created in 1999. It is chaired alternately by the UEMOA and CEMAC Commissions and its secretariat is provided by the Treasury Department. French. Officially, its mission is “to report on the evolution of the economic and monetary situation of the franc zone, to monitor the functioning of multilateral surveillance in each subregion, to report on the progress made in this area and to make recommendations to consolidate this process [16] “. COCOZOF comprises “four parties, namely UEMOA (Commission, BCEAO and BOAD), CEMAC (Commission, BEAC and BDEAC), Comoros (Union of Comoros and BCC) and France. AFRISTAT also brings its expertise to the Committee. [17] It submits to the validation of each semi-annual meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Franc Zone a report on the state of convergence of the zone, accompanied by resolutions. We will return very soon to this palinodie, this new paradigm of monetary relations within the franc zone, and especially on the bridges between France and the International Monetary Fund to better monitor and control the African economies of the franc zone.
Conclusion
You have to be honest and say things as they are and not as they should be. The facial examination of the founding texts of the BCEAO can not validly support the existence of a “right of veto” of France within the decision-making bodies of this institution. At most, and by inference, we could speak of “unanimous right”, to borrow an absurd formula from a former bank executive accustomed to rough handling and creepy words. To put it better, France has a “right of scrutiny” (this expression seems to us more appropriate) on the activities of the regulator and the supervisor of WAMU.
It must nevertheless be acknowledged, and even deplored, that nearly six decades after the decolonization of the continent, the insistent and persistent view of France on the so-called “African” currency is resolutely contradictory. In truth, it is proved that whenever one resorts to a language dressing, it is generally to hide a reality much deeper than the legal quibble exposed. The French politician Martine Aubry, quoting her grandmother, said that “when it’s fuzzy, it’s because there is a wolf”. And we add a codicil: if there is a wolf, it is that there is a blow. Moreover, it is not excluded – it is a hypothesis – that the application of the texts referred to can be quite different during the sessions of the decision-making bodies of the WAMU (board of directors and monetary policy committee) . But without documented evidence, it will be risky to support such claims. Even if the famous French economist Jacques Attali admitted the atypical character of the operation of the franc zone: “No monetary zone survives without a federal government. The only example in the history of an area that survives without a federal government is the franc zone. It exists, but it is a very particular case. France controls the economy of the countries that are members of it quite [18]. To better grasp the power of this statement, it is necessary to make a brief presentation of its author. Jacques Attali is one of the most widely read, listened and followed French personalities in the world. Doctor of State in Economics from the Paris-Dauphine University, he graduated from the Ecole Polytechnique (major of the class of 1963), the School of Mines, Sciences Po and the National School of Administration . He was special adviser to President François Mitterrand [19] for a whole decade (from 1981 to 1991), then founder and first president of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). To close this parenthesis, recall that it is Jacques Attali, sometimes nicknamed “councilor of the princes”, sometimes “maker of the kings”, who introduced Emmanuel Macron to the former president François Holland …
In the end, there is no point in fixing the quantum of French representatives in the statutory bodies of the African central banks of the franc zone. We must keep its neurons in place and resolve to reality. The world, in Africa as elsewhere, is not sanitized. It will never be a shelter for teddy bears and hugs, much less a sanctuary for weak minds and sensitive souls. All, even diplomats with more sweet than sulphurous language, agree that states have no friends but interests to conquer and defend. And all means are implemented to achieve this. Already in the nineteenth century, the famous philosopher Nietzsche compared the state to a “cold monster”, the most formidable of “cold monsters”, capable of anything to protect his interests.
The balance of power between France and the African countries of the franc zone goes well beyond an arithmetic count of votes and a facial reading of statutory texts.
It is primarily the relationship between a former colonial power and its former colonies. With the decolonization of Africa, Paris has managed to leave while remaining. He just worked on the staging, renaming the CFA franc with tropical colors.
It is also the ratio between the world’s 5th largest economy and 15 of the poorest countries in the world, which, together, weigh 16 times less. Otherwise, the 68 million French produce in less than a month (22 days exactly) what the 164 million Africans in the franc zone produce for a whole year!
It is finally the relationship between the guarantor and the users of a currency, which can only be appreciated through the triple prism: geopolitical, geoeconomic and geostrategic. Wherever we are, in the Board of Directors or in the Monetary Policy Committee of the African Central Banks of the Franc Zone, it is not therefore to the number of representatives that we must assess the stature of each statutory member, but rather, their economic, political and military weight.
That’s the truth. Everything else is evanescent.
Cheickna Bounajim Cissé, FCFA: Hidden Face of African Finance, (Editions BoD, 452 pages, Jan. 2019.
Economist and essayist, he is the President of the Commission “Banks & Competitiveness” of the CAVIE (African Center for Intelligence and Economic Intelligence). Holds an MBA from the University of Paris Dauphine and the IAE of Paris, he holds a professional degree in Political Science and Social Sciences – option Journalism of the French Institute of Press (University Panthéon-Assas), owns a master’s degree in business management from ENA Bamako and graduated from a postgraduate degree in Banking (ITB – CNAM of Paris). He is the author of the acronym MANGANESE, designating nine emerging or emerging African countries. A contributor to several media and the author of several publications, including “Building emergence, a pact for the future” (BoD, 2016), he defines himself as an “emergent”, an activist of the emergence of Africa.
[1] The cfiles: neologism used in this book to describe the defenders, the supporters of the maintenance of the CFA franc, the pro-CFA.
[2] The cfobes: neologism used in this book to designate the slayers, the defrauders, the slingers, the opponents of the CFA franc, the anti-CFA.
[3] Nicolas Agbohou, The CFA Franc for dummies; “The CFA franc and the euro against Africa”, online: cameroonvoice.com/news/article-news-14007.html
[4] Nicolas Agbohou, economist and political scientist, Professor at the University of Versailles Saint-Quentin (France); Aprica Info No. 005 of Wednesday, March 13, 2013; online: http://www.civox.net/National-monitoring-of-France-in-Africa-The-verites-of-Professor-Nicolas-Agbohou_a2382.html
[5] Éric Essono Tsimi, “The CFA Franc, from” pure rag paper “”, July 15, 2013, online: www.huffingtonpost.fr/eric-essono-tsimi/franc-cfa_b_3591389.html
[6] Online: www.rfi.fr/emission/20171001-rester-sortir-franc-cfa
[7] France’s representative on the BCEAO Monetary Policy Committee is Françoise Drumetz, Director of External Cooperation of the Banque de France. On the Board of Directors, it is Mr. Yves Charpentier, financial adviser for Africa at the General Directorate of the Treasury. (2014 BCEAO Annual Report).
[8] According to Article 66 of the Statutes of the BCEAO: “The Monetary Policy Committee is responsible for defining the monetary policy within the WAMU, as well as its instruments, in accordance with the provisions of these statutes. ”
[9] “The Board of Directors is responsible for matters relating to the management of the Central Bank, in accordance with the provisions of the present statutes. “(Article 79 of the statutes of the BCEAO).
[10] Speaking about the presence of the representative of the French state on the board of directors of his institution, the governor of the BCEAO declared: “He expresses his points of view and that is useful because can not also, in a central bank, manage a currency which is of public essence while being in the blur. It must be in the most total transparency “; online: www.rfi.fr/emission/20171001-rester-sortir-franc-cfa
[11] The Statutes of the BCEAO provide: “However, proposals to amend the present statutes in the areas falling within the competence of the Monetary Policy Committee shall be adopted unanimously” (Article 72); “However, proposals to amend the present statutes in areas falling within the competence of the Board of Directors are adopted unanimously” (Article 82).
[12] Online: www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/371694/economie/tiemoko-meyliet-kone-gouverneur-de-bceao-franc-cfa-gere-africains/
[13] Online: www.beac.int/index.php/beac/organisation?index_php?option=com_content
[14] According to the composition of the Board of Directors on July 20, 2017, the directors representing the interests of France are: Emmanuel Rocher (Chief of Staff to the Governor of the Banque de France), Samuel Goldstein (Head of the Sub-Saharan Africa Office in the Treasury Department), Jacques Biau (Deputy Assistant Director of Democratic Governance at the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Development) and Danie Lubeth (Director of the Agence française de développement); online: www.banque-comores.km/index.php?page=organogram
[15] Online: www.banque-france.fr/la-banque-de-france/nous-connaitre/la-gouvernance/les-organes-de-gouvernance; https://acpr.banque-france.fr/lacpr/colleges-et-commissions/college-de-supervision/composition-du-college-de-supervision
[16] Online: www.banque-france.fr/sites/default/files/media/2017/04/05/report-convergence-nominale_rmzf.pdf
[17] Online: www.banque-france.fr/sites/default/files/media/2017/04/05/report-convergence-nominale_rmzf.pdf
[18] “Jacques Attali and the crisis”, BFM, 23 September 2011; video online: www.dailymotion.com/video/xlq3wy_jacques-attali-et-create-bfm-23-september-2011_news?start=3
[19] The late President Mitterrand said of his sherpa: “I do not need a computer, I have Jacques Attali”; online: www.lesechos.fr/21/01/2008/LesEchos/20092-194-ECH_jacques-attali.htm
